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1. Introduction 
 
Empirical research into the effects of formal land rights on farmer behaviour presents an ambiguous 
picture. In theory, formal land rights are expected to have beneficial effects on land productivity 
(Feder and Feeny, 1991; Besley, 1995; Binswanger, Deininger and Feder, 1995). In particular, 
when land is scarce the formalisation of land rights is considered crucial to further economic 
growth. The most common effects expected from secure property rights are their allocative effects 
on the one hand, where land is used in more efficient ways, and their land investment effects, 
including increased access to credit and land productivity, on the other. The allocative effects can 
include changing crop choices, where the tendency to grow longer cycle crops is correlated with 
more secure property rights, or the transfer of land from less to more dynamic farmers, resulting in 
more consolidated land holdings (Deininger and Jin, 2003; Ravallion and van de Walle, 2003). 
Increased tenure security is expected to provide farmers with incentives to invest in land 
improvements that may only have productive benefits in the long run (Hayes, Roth and Zepeda, 
1997; Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996; Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003; Deininger and Jin, 2006; Ali 
et al, 2007). Farmer willingness and ability to invest in land may be enhanced through increased 
access to credit when land becomes available as collateral. 
Although the beneficial effects of tenure security are clear in theory, in practice the expected effects 
are not always found. Positive effects of property rights on investment, land yields or credit appear 
limited or inexistent, or dependent on the institutional environment (Migot-Adholla et al, 1991; 
Place and Hazell, 1993; Binswanger, Deininger and Feder, 1995; Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998; 
Carter and Olinto, 2003; Van Tassel, 2004; Barslund and Tarp, 20081). Also when the endogeneity 
of land property rights is controlled for, the positive investment impact of tenure security is found in 
some cases (Goldstein and Udry, 2005), but contested in others (Carter, Wiebe and Blarel, 1994; 
Besley, 1995; Braselle, Gaspart and Platteau, 2002). Further, it has been argued that title ownership 
and ownership security are not necessarily synonymous and that informal systems are not inherently 
weaker than formal ones (Roth et al, 1989; Platteau, 2000). In addition, tenure security can be 
expressed in more or less detail yielding different results. For example, the rights to bequeath land 
may not yield as large an effect as the right to sell land. In the latter case the expected returns to 
                                                 
1 Barslund and Tarp (2008) use data collected in 2002 in four provinces in Vietnam and find significantly positive 
effects of land use rights on household demand for formal credit in only one province. They find positive but not 
significant effects in the other three provinces and a negative effect on the demand for informal credit. They find no 
significant effects on the amount of credit obtained by rural households. 
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investment are increased because it is easier to sell land and convert it into liquid assets (Besley, 
1995; Platteau, 1996). In summary, even though the individualisation of land property rights is 
generally advocated as good policy for growth and poverty reduction (Deininger, 2003), the 
empirical literature suggests that the effects of land property rights on investment, credit, crop 
choice or yields are not a priori clear and therefore require case specific evaluation. 
In most of the literature on the effects of land titles, the household is regarded as unitary and land 
rights are considered a household right, the effect of which does not depend on the specificities of 
the title holder (mostly the household head). However, the assumption of a unitary household model 
is often rejected in empirical research. The household can be a place of cooperation but also of 
conflict (Sen, 1989). Individual titling may change relative bargaining positions within the 
household and if household members have different preferences towards crop choices, different risk 
behaviour, or different access to credit, the property right effects may vary. Similar to the effects of 
household land titles, the effects of individual titling are not clear a priori and depend on the 
institutional framework, the protection and enforcement possibilities of rights and opportunities to 
use them.2
Since 1993 land use certificates have been issued in Vietnam to formalise household claims to the 
land they are tilling.3 It was common to inscribe only the name of the household head. 
Modifications of the Land Law in 2003 state that land use certificates should bear the names of two 
persons if the land belongs to both.4 This change provides an opportunity to test whether titling per 
se, but also single versus joint titling, affects production. More specifically, we explore the effects 
of the issuance of land use certificates (LUCs) in Vietnam, where we consider individual user rights 
with either one or two persons registered versus household user rights (which do not make a 
distinction between the two types of registration), on rice yields. Rice remains the most important 
crop for most farmers, both in terms of generating income and as the main staple. The data allow us 
                                                 
2 For example, Place and Migot-Adholla (1998) analyse the effects of registration in the name of the household head but 
contrast their results in some cases with the titles that include registration in the name of close relatives, finding 
different results.  
3 For an overview of the evolution of land rights in Vietnam, see Kerkvliet (2006). 
4 The issuance of land use certificates originated from the 1993 land law together with the rights to transfer, exchange, 
bequeath, lease and mortgage land. Originally, only one household member’s name was inscribed in the land use 
certificate, usually the head of the household, but in 2003 the law was modified stating that for jointly owned land a 
second person’s name should be inscribed, which would most likely be the spouse. The assumption of increased 
“ownership” for women is rejected as several laws existing before the Land Law 2003 ensure women’s property rights. 
E.g. the Civil Law and Marriage Law state that all assets generated during marriage are the property of both spouses 
and must be shared in case of divorce. The qualitative research of Rao (2006) also shows that the right to land for 
women does not change their status or decision-making authority (but increases their work burden). 
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to analyse rice production at both the plot and the household level. First, since we have plot specific 
production data for rice, we are able to use household fixed effects estimation techniques to test 
whether property rights affect rice yields differently when they are exclusively or jointly held. 
Secondly, we use a stochastic frontier approach to test whether household production efficiency 
changes with the number of title owners. Doing so also allows us to evaluate the (rice) productivity 
effects of the original 1993 Land Law and the additional effects of the new 2003 Land Law. To our 
knowledge this is the first empirical analysis on yield effects of land titles diversified by household 
members who actually hold the title for a specific plot. 
The data are from the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey 2006 (VARHS). This 
dataset contains detailed plot level information for rural households in 12 provinces spread over 
different regions of Vietnam.5 These data allow us to conduct more detailed research on 
productivity effects of property rights than what is commonly found in the literature. We analyse 
the rice yield effects of the land use certificate in general, and by number of household members on 
the land use certificate. Furthermore, we investigate whether any gender differences exist by 
comparing male versus female headed households. We find that owning a land use certificate 
(LUC) is positively related to productivity levels of rice plots, but singly held LUCs are driving this 
positive result. The positive result only exists in male headed households. There is no significant 
effect of land titles on rice yield in female headed households. The household level analysis of 
efficiency confirms that where land rights are held exclusively, efficiency is increased compared to 
joint ownership. However, it also reveals that once the gender of the head of household is controlled 
for, exclusively held titles are more efficiency enhancing when held by females compared with 
males. 
The paper is organised as follows. The data are described in section 2 while section 3 presents the 
methodology. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in section 4 and section 5 
concludes and puts our findings into perspective. 
 
2. Data 
In Vietnam all land is owned by the people of Vietnam and managed by the state. The laws that 
govern land distribution have been reformed several times since the decollectivisation of land in 
                                                 
5 The 12 provinces are Ha Tay in the Red River Delta, Lao Cai and Phu Tho in the North East, Lai Chau and Dien Bien 
in the North West, Nghe An in the North Central Coast, Quang Nam and Khanh Hoa in the South Central Coast, Dak 
Lak, Dak Nong and Lam Dong in the Central Highlands, and Long An in the Mekong River Delta. 
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1988. Under the 1993 land law, land use certificates (LUCs) were issued as proof of household 
claims to the land they cultivated. At the same time, households were allowed to engage in land 
transactions such as the transfer, exchange, bequeathing, leasing and mortgaging of land (use 
certificates). For agricultural land, rural households reported in 2004 that LUCs existed for 76.5 
percent of plots (Brandt, 2005). The most recent land law of 2003 ensures an improved land 
registration system and clearer administrative procedures together with the requirement for the LUC 
to bear the names of two persons if the plot belongs to both. In most cases this law implies that the 
name of both the household head and the spouse should appear on the LUC. Some 12.3 percent of 
the titles in rural Vietnam bore a male and a female name in 2004 (Brandt, 2005). In Vietnam the 
LUC is often called the red book, derived from the colour of the cover page, and we will use LUC 
and red book interchangeably. 
We use data from the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey 2006 (VARHS), which was 
implemented in 12 provinces. The provinces were selected in order to provide a basis for 
monitoring the progress of farmers in provinces covered by Danida support programmes.6 The 
households surveyed are a sub-sample of rural households interviewed by the General Statistics 
Office (GSO) in 2002 or 2004 for the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS). The 
questionnaire was developed in a co-operation between the University of Copenhagen and a series 
of Vietnamese partners including ILSSA, CIEM and IPSARD.7 In total 2,324 households were 
interviewed between July and September 2006. The households are spread over 466 communes and 
161 districts. Besides general sections with information on individual household members, the 
survey contains detailed information on access to and use of productive resources such as land, 
labour, credit and other inputs. In this paper, we use the land and agricultural production section 
extensively. The survey is a rich source of information regarding plot level characteristics. It 
includes size and quality of plots, their slope and irrigation infrastructure, when and how the plot 
was acquired, whether the household has a LUC for the plot and whose name(s) appears in the 
LUC. Furthermore, information exists on which crops are grown on each plot and, for rice only, the 
amount of output during the three last agricultural seasons per plot. 
                                                 
6 Five provinces are covered under Danida’s Agricultural Sector Programme Support (ASPS) and seven under the 
Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS). 
7 Development Economics Research Group (DERG), Department of Economics, Copenhagen, Institute for Labour 
Studies and Social Affairs (ILSSA), Central Institute for Economic Management (CEIM), Institute for Policy and 
Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD), Hanoi. A descriptive overview report is available at 
http://www.ciem.org.vn/home/en/upload/info/attach/1194421575609_Characteristics_of_the_Vietnamese_Rural_Econo
my.pdf
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In the following tables we present an overview of the red book situation of the plots owned by the 
surveyed households and the characteristics of those plots, the crops grown on plots by different 
land title types and the rice yields derived from the plots. We divide the plots according to (1) 
whether the plot has a LUC, and (2) how many household member names appear in the LUC (zero, 
one or two)8.  
In Table 1 we show the red book status of plots in the surveyed households, where plots are divided 
according to the decomposition outlined above. The numbers are also reported for cropland held by 
female headed households versus male headed households. In total there is information on 11,683 
plots, 10,099 of which are used for cultivation of crops, either annual or perennial.9 Focusing on 
crop land, LUCs are held for 82 percent of all plots,10 but mostly only one household name is 
written in the red book (87 percent). This person is typically the husband or a single male head but 
in 16 percent of all red books only the wife or a single female head name appears. When two 
household members are written in the red book (8 percent of red books have two names), these are 
generally husband and wife: both husband and wife names appear in 7 percent of the red books. 
Any other name situation, such as people outside the household, children or parents of the head or 
spouse or combinations thereof account for 8 percent of the red book types. Female headed 
households appear to have red books on 88 percent of their cropland while this share is only 80 
percent for plots owned by male headed households. Plots are likely to have only one name 
inscribed in the red book whether they are held by a male or a female headed household. The 
difference occurs where there is either no household member inscribed or two household members. 
The latter occurs in only 2 percent of the female headed plots but in 9 percent of the male headed 
plots.11 Red books are more likely to have zero household member names in the case of a female 
headed household, which may happen if the late husband’s name is still in the red book or a 
parent’s name occurs. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
8 Zero household members can occur on the red book. In this case the names listed are not considered part of the 
household and cannot be linked to the household roster. In case of one person this will mostly be the household head 
but children or parents of the household head or the spouse can also occur. When there are two persons on the red book 
this is usually the head and his spouse but can also include combinations of the head or spouse with any of their parents 
or children. 
9 Other uses are purely residential land, forestry land, grazing land, aquaculture land. 
10 Ten percent of all households have zero plots with a red book and 65 percent of households have red books on all 
their plots. 
11 Two names are much more likely to occur on red books held by ethnic minority households (22 percent of their red 
books have two names compared to 5 percent in Kinh households). The latter suggests that ethnic minorities have 
acquired their red books on average later than Kinh households, after the Land Law 2003 came into effect. 
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Table 2 presents a summary of plot characteristics by red book status of the plot. Plots with and 
without LUCs are different on the whole range of characteristics included in Table 2. Plots with a 
LUC appear to be smaller, closer to the house, more likely to be flat-sloped and to be irrigated, 
more likely to be allocated to the household by the state or commune and to have restrictions on the 
choice of crops. The characteristics of plots with a red book generally appear to be more favourable 
for growing rice. Table 2 also suggests that plots with a red book are more likely to have been 
acquired before 1993 compared to the plots without a red book. The latter are more likely to have 
been required after 1998 than the former (33 versus 13 percent respectively).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Conditional upon having a red book, the characteristics of plots also appear to differ according to 
the number of household members named in the red book. Comparing the situation of one and two 
household members, nearly the whole series of plot characteristics is significantly different between 
both situations: plots with a red book bearing two names are significantly further away from the 
house, are less likely to have a flat slope, to be irrigated, to bear restrictions on crop choice and to 
have been acquired by the state or commune. Plots with a red book with two household member 
names are more likely to have been acquired in more recent years compared to the plots with a red 
book with one name. But overall, the age structure of the plot is not strongly different across the 
different red book situations.12  
Next, we look into crop growing patterns by type of plot according to the red book situation of the 
plot (Table 3). As the characteristics of plots with a red book already suggested, they are much 
more likely to be planted with rice (70 percent versus 56 percent of plots without LUC) to the 
disadvantage mainly of other staple foods such as maize. There is no strong difference between 
annual or perennial crop growing on plots with or without LUC (85 percent annual crops on plots 
without versus 87 percent on plots with LUC). 
The fact that such a high percentage of plots are cultivated with rice (67 percent) is due to a long 
tradition of rice growing ensured in part by government national food security considerations. More 
recently foreign exchange generation may also play a role considering the importance of rice in 
Vietnam’s exports. In many communes restrictions on crop choice continue to exist. Households 
report that crop choice is restricted (to growing rice) on 54 percent of all plots. Plots with a red book 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately there is no information available on the year in which the red book was acquired. This would have 
allowed us to check whether two names only appear on new red books or whether households have additional names 
inscribed in old red books. 
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appear to be even more likely to have restrictions on crop choice (58 percent versus 40 on plots 
without red book, Table 2) which may partly explain the large differences in plots allocated to rice 
according to red book ownership.   
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Even across plots with a red book, there are differences in crop growing behaviour according to the 
number of household member names in the red book. Those plots with a red book bearing the 
names of zero household members are the least likely to be cultivated with rice, followed by those 
with the names of two household members. The plots with a red book bearing only one household 
member name are the most likely to be planted with rice.  
Restricting our analysis to rice growing plots, Table 4 presents average and median rice yields (in 
kg per square metre) by red book type.13 In general, the average and median rice yields are around 
half a kilo per square metre. On average, there appears to be no difference between the yields 
obtained from plots with or without a LUC. Conditional upon having a red book, yields do appear 
to be different according to the number of household members inscribed, with two names resulting 
in the lowest yields. However, these differences are not significant.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Thus from the bivariate analysis red books do not appear to ensure higher yields (via increased 
incentives or improved access to credit allowing productive investment). This is somewhat 
surprising given that red book plots are associated with better rice growing conditions (e.g. flat 
slopes, more likely to be irrigated, closer to the house). A multivariate analysis correcting for other 
plot characteristics will shed more light on the issue. In the next section, we present the 
methodology used to explore how the red book situation affects rice yields at plot and household 
level. 
 
3. Methodological Framework 
 
Plot level analysis 
The general framework we use to empirically explore the relationship between plot level rice yields 
and the land title situation of the plot follows the approach proposed by Udry (1996) and applied by 
                                                 
13 We excluded one observation with an extreme value for rice yield from the analysis in Table 4. 
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Goldstein and Udry (2005). We focus on the within household variation across plots to identify the 
potential impact of land titles on rice yields using household fixed effects. Differences in plot 
characteristics are also controlled for.  
The equation of interest is specified as (see model in Appendix 1): 
hi hi hi h hiQ X Rβ α λ ε= + + +  (1) 
 
where  are the rice yields of plot i owned by household h. hiQ hiX  are plot characteristics; hλ  are 
household fixed effects and hiε  is a statistical noise term assumed to have an extreme value 
distribution. The key variable of interest is hiR  which represents the red book status of the plot. We 
consider a number of different forms for hiR  which are discussed below. As we cannot assume 
exogeneity of the hiR  variable we use an instrumental variables approach.
14  
Household level analysis 
Next, we explore the relationship between land rights and rice yields further by considering the 
direct impact of red book status on household efficiency. We do this by estimating a stochastic yield 
function at the household level that allows us to explain heterogeneity in efficiency levels across 
households with household and plot characteristics. We express the production function in yield 
form to reduce the multicollinearity between land area and the other inputs.15 The production 
technology is thus defined by expressing rice yields as a function of inputs per square metre, 
technical inefficiencies capturing the degree to which household yields are below the optimal level 
of production and a random error component:16
( ); h hv uh hq f x eβ −=  (2) 
 
where  are total rice yields of household h; hq hx  is the vector of inputs into the production process 
expressed in per square metre terms; β  is the vector of parameters of the yield function,  
represents statistical noise and other random external events influencing the production process.
hv
17 
The technical efficiency effects are given by the set of non-negative random variables . Using the hu
                                                 
14 The model is estimated by instrumental variables fixed effects in Stata. 
15 Expressing the function in yield form requires dividing all of the inputs by land area. This imposes homogeneity of 
degree one in the inputs and constant returns to scale. (See Ajibefun et al. (2006) for a similar application). 
16 Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) were the first to propose this approach. It has since 
been widely applied in the literature. 
17  are assumed to be i.i.d. hv ( )20, vN σ . 
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Kumbhakar et al. (1991) approach,  are assumed to have two components: a deterministic 
component explained by a vector of observed variables, , assumed to affect the efficiency level of 
a household and a random component given by 
hu
hz
hτ . 
h hu z hδ τ= +  (3) 
 
where δ  are parameters to be estimated.  are assumed to be independently distributed as 
truncations at zero of 
hu
( 2,h uN z )δ σ . We assume that  includes both household and plot 
characteristics. Plot characteristics are included as area shares, which is the share of the total area 
owned by the household which possess a certain characteristic. The yield function is specified in 
translog form.
hz
18
 
4. Empirical results 
 
The key question of interest in this paper is whether differences in property rights influence 
production. In order to test for this using the models presented in section 3, we assume that property 
rights are determined by the red book status of the plot. Different specifications of the red book 
variable are considered for each model. 
First, for the plot level yield model (equation (1)), we consider whether a plot has a red book as an 
indicator of whether or not property rights are formally defined for the plot in question. Secondly, 
we include more detail on the exact naming structure in the red book. The categories considered 
are: 1) no red book for the plot is held by the household; 2) the red book includes one household 
member name only; 3) the red book includes the names of two household members, in most cases 
the household members are the husband and wife and as such this category applies mostly to male 
headed households. Each of these categories is included as an indicator variable in the model. The 
category including red books with persons not considered a household member is excluded. We are 
uncertain whether this category is formally stating household ownership for the plot. If it involves 
other persons still alive such as a parent of the household head, the household may still be insecure 
about eventual ownership of the plot which may for example have to be shared with other siblings. 
We do the first analysis (i.e. red book versus no red book) for the full sample and for households 
with a male head and female head separately to verify whether land titles have different effects for 
                                                 
18 The model is estimated using the Battese and Coelli (1996) software, Frontier version 4.1. See Appendix 2 for 
appropriate specification tests. 
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plots held by female headed versus male headed households. The two names in the red book are 
most likely to be the names of the husband and wife, so in the second step (i.e. one name or two 
names versus no red book), we restrict the sample to only male headed households where the 
evaluation of inscribing two persons in the LUC is most relevant.19
Since households choose which plots have a LUC and whose name appears on it, it would be 
unrealistic to assume that the red book variables we consider are exogenous in the intra-household 
model (equation(1)). We use an instrumental variables technique to correct for the endogeneity of 
each of these variables. Two instruments are used:20 1) the year the plot was acquired, divided into 
four categories with years where changes to the Land Law were implemented as cut-off values; and 
2) the means by which the plot was acquired, that is, whether it was given to the household by the 
state or commune, whether it was inherited or whether it was purchased. In the case of the former, 
we would expect the time the plot was acquired to be highly correlated with the red book status of 
the plot on the basis that households may be more likely to register the plot with a LUC at the time 
of purchase/acquisition than at a later stage. The nature of this registration will depend on the 
version of the Land Law that was in place at that time. For example, plots acquired post 2003 are 
more likely to be registered with two names in the red book while plots acquired prior to 1993 may 
be less likely to have a red book or to have a red book with two names. In the case of the latter, we 
expect the way in which the plot was acquired to be correlated as well with the red book status of 
the plot. For example, it may be the case that plots given by the state are more likely to be registered 
while plots inherited through parental inheritance may be more likely to have the wife's or the 
husband and wife’s names registered. We expect both of these variables to be good instruments 
given that the productivity of the plot is unlikely to be correlated with either. Estimates of reduced 
form models for the endogenous variables and tests for endogeneity support the validity of these 
instruments (see Appendix 2).21  
For the production function model (equation (2)), we first consider the share of land area used for 
rice production with a red book as an explanatory variable in the inefficiency component of the 
model (equation (3)). We also consider the various naming structures in the red book listed above. 
These categories are also included as the share of land area with each category of red book status. 
                                                 
19 In the total sample of plots held by female headed household (1,924 plots) only 48 come with a red book where two 
persons are inscribed. 
20 Two instruments are necessary given that in the second formulation of the red book variable two categorical variables 
are included in the model. 
21 While it appears that the binary variable indicating that two names appear in the red book is not in fact endogenous, it 
is nonetheless instrumented given that it is a sub-category of an endogenous variable. 
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Finally, we consider whether the gender of the title holder makes a difference to efficiency by 
including: 1) the share of land area with the husband/male head in the red book; 2) the share of land 
area with the wife/female head in the red book; and 3) the share of land area with both husband and 
wife in the red book, with controls included for the ‘other’ category. The full list of plot and 
household variables used in the analysis is presented in Table 5.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The results for the rice yield model given by equation (1) are presented in Table 6. Columns (1) to 
(3) show results for the full sample. In the first column, yields are estimated without a variable 
reflecting property rights and linear household fixed effects estimation is used instead of the 
instrumental variables fixed effects used for all the other specifications. Columns (4) and (5) show 
results for the male headed households and column (6) shows the results for female headed 
households. The key variables determining yields are the area of the plot, which is included to 
control for economies of scale in production, and the quality of the plot (measured by its sales 
value). The significant and negative effect of size provides evidence of decreasing returns to scale 
in rice production. The quality of the plot is a highly significant positive determinant of differences 
in rice yields. The slope of the plot seems insignificant in explaining differences in yields, but this 
may be due to multicollinearity with the quality variable. Both irrigation types (canals and other 
types) appear to affect yields negatively. This is somewhat counterintuitive, while, as might be 
expected, restrictions appear to affect rice yields negatively.22
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Based on the full sample, yields on plots, which are registered with a red book are significantly 
higher than yields on plots with no defined land rights (Column (2)). This is an indication that, at 
least for rice, formal land titles have a productivity increasing effect. Further, when we use more 
detailed information on the name structure on the land title, it appears that plots with a red book 
where one household member is named have a positive effect on rice yields, but plots with red 
books where two household members are named do not have the same productivity increasing 
effect (Column (3)). The results are even stronger in male headed households, which provide a 
more relevant comparative (Column (4)). This result is somewhat puzzling, but is probably due to 
the fact that two names might only appear on newly acquired red books (after 2003) and the 
                                                 
22 The distance of the plot to the family home is found to be insignificant in all specifications. Spatial fixed effects 
which control for the radial distance of each plot from the family home were also considered but were found to be 
insignificant. 
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productivity enhancing effects have not yet taken place (three years after the law). Alternatively, it 
could also be that exclusive property rights (with one person’s name inscribed) are more conducive 
to investment than joint property rights (with more names inscribed). 
To investigate whether the effect of land titles is different for plots owned by female versus male 
headed households we compare columns (5) and (6). It can be seen that the positive effect of land 
titles on rice yields in fact only exists in male headed households while there is no significant effect 
of land titles on variation in yields in female headed households.23 This could mean that either the 
ownership right granted by a formal land title is viewed differently in the hands of male and female 
heads or has different effects due to different gender behaviour. For example, a title held by women 
may not improve their access to credit as much as it does for men, or Vietnamese women may be 
more risk averse and decide not to jeopardise their land title to acquire credit. It may also be due to 
the fact that intra-household bargaining issues matter to a lesser extent in female headed 
households, where the head is most likely single. We cannot distinguish here which of these is the 
case. 
The second model we estimate analyses the determinants of efficiency through the estimation of a 
household yield function (equation (2)). Output and input variables are described in Table 5. The 
results for the inefficiency equation associated with this model are presented in Table 7.24 We 
interpret the results for each variable as the effect it has on inefficiency. The results are as we would 
expect for both the significant household characteristic variables and the plot characteristic 
variables. In contrast to the results for the plot level analysis, the proportion of land area that is 
irrigated has a negative effect on inefficiency (that is, increases efficiency). We also find that the 
proportion of land area with restrictions negatively affects inefficiency levels. This is contrary to 
what we might expect, but could be due to specialisation, and the fact that restrictions are mainly 
applied on higher quality plots. As might be expected, the proportion of land area that is sloped has 
a positive effect on inefficiency. While few of the household characteristic variables are significant, 
education plays an important role in determining efficiency. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
23 Data limitations prevent us from exploring gender differences in land titling within male headed households. We 
explore these differences further within the household yield function model. 
24 The yield equation results are presented in Appendix 3. In all cases a Cobb-Douglas model is rejected in favour of the 
Translog specification. Tests of the joint significance of the inefficiency effects also lead to a rejection of the more 
restricted model in all cases. Likelihood ratio tests also reject deterministic models in favour of the stochastic frontier 
approach. 
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The red book variable is negative and significant when both plot characteristics and household 
controls are included (column (2)). This means that the greater the land area covered by a red book 
the higher the efficiency level of the household. This is consistent with our findings for the plot 
level yield model. When this variable is broken down into its various categories we see that, as in 
our previous model, it only applies to red books that include one name only (columns (3) and (4)). 
This result suggests that where individuals have exclusive property rights for plots, households are 
more efficient than where the property rights are shared between husband and wife. This result was 
suggested by the summary statistics presented in Table 4, and suggests that the incentives to be 
efficient are greater where individuals are the sole decision maker in relation to production on that 
plot. 
The final model considered disaggregates the red book categories further and considers the gender 
of the red book holder.25 As revealed in column (5), we find that only in cases where the 
husband/male head is included in the red book does the variable have a significant effect on 
efficiency levels. This is consistent with our earlier results, and suggests that the positive effect of 
land titles on rice yields only exists in male headed households. However, once we control for 
gender of the household head (column (6)), we find that the greater the proportion of land area with 
land titles held by the wife/female head also has a positive effect on efficiency levels. This suggests 
that while land titling does not appear to hold any efficiency benefits within female headed 
households (as revealed in our earlier analysis), once this is controlled for, the greater the land area 
covered by exclusively female titled plots the more efficient the household. 
In summary, we find that in contrast to much of the previous empirical literature on the effect of 
security of land tenure on outcomes, defining property rights through owning a LUC appears to 
have a positive effect on the productivity levels of rice plots and households in general. We also 
find that the way in which the property rights are defined appears to affect both rice yields and 
efficiency levels. In particular, we find that only where property rights are exclusively defined does 
owning a LUC have a significant and positive effect on yields and efficiency levels. Moreover, this 
only appears to hold within male headed households. However, the results of the household 
production function analysis suggest that within male headed households, the proportion of land 
area with a LUC exclusively in the wife’s name has a positive effect on household efficiency, and to 
an even greater extent than the husband having exclusive rights. 
                                                 
25 The absence of suitable instruments prevents us from exploring this disaggregation within the plot level model. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
We have used household data collected in 2006 in 12 provinces in Vietnam to shed some light on 
the effect of land titles on rice yields and household efficiency in growing rice. The dataset provides 
detailed plot level information allowing us to use a household fixed effects approach to analyse rice 
yields. The determinants of inefficiency are analysed by estimating a household yield function. 
Much of the previous literature in this field treats the household as the unit of analysis ignoring that 
the impact of land titling may differ depending on the exact naming structure of the title. This is 
despite the fact that the assumption of a unitary household model is often rejected in empirical 
research. Our data and approach allow us to explore this issue in more depth, by allowing the effect 
of titling to be different according to whether the title is exclusively or jointly held.  
Both models confirm that holding a red book, the official document of household long-term 
entitlement to the use of land, has a positive effect on plot level yields and household efficiency in 
growing rice. This confirms that the assignment of property rights matters for productivity. 
Moreover, we find that differences in the way in which the title is assigned, in our case whether 
there is one or two names registered in the red book, has an important impact on productivity. 
While we find strong positive effects of exclusive land titles, we find no significant effect on 
productivity of jointly held titles. This may be due to the fairly short period of time between the 
modification to the Land Law (2003) and our sample (2006), but we conclude that productivity 
enhancing effects are only clear for the 2006 sample when property rights are exclusively held.  
Furthermore, this result only appears to hold for male headed households. An explanation for this is 
that property rights may matter more in cases where intra-household bargaining is likely to be an 
issue. For example, we would expect the benefits to a female household member (wife) of holding 
exclusive property rights over a plot to be greater if the head of household is male than if the head 
of household is the female in question. The results of the household yield function analysis support 
this. Once we control for female headed households, the proportion of land area that is titled 
exclusively to the wife has a positive effect on household efficiency. While we also find a positive 
result for exclusively male titled plots, it is of a lower magnitude.  
Our results highlight, first, that it is necessary to go beyond the assumption of the unitary household 
when analysing property rights. Ignoring this may well be a key reason why the productivity 
enhancing effect of property rights is found weak or non-existent in much of the previous literature 
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on land titling. Second, in our study property rights do indeed appear to have the expected 
productivity enhancing effects in rice growing, especially when they are exclusively held. Third, it 
may well be too early to capture the full impact of the 2003 Land Law, including the true effects of 
jointly held titles. This suggests that future research should be pursued when relevant data become 
available. Fourth, the positive effect of formal land use titles on rice productivity and efficiency 
implies that policy efforts should be intensified to cover the remaining 20 percent of plots in 
Vietnam, which are still not covered with Red Books. This is put in broader perspective by noting 
that those households, who do not have any of their plots protected with formal land use titles, are 
typically ethnic minorities, the poorest and the most remote. 
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Table 1: Land Use Certificate situation of plots 
 All plots Annual and perennial 
croplanda
Female 
headed 
HHs’ plots 
Male 
headed 
HHs’ plots 
 Obs % Obs % % % 
Total plots 11,683 100 10,099 100 100 100 
       
Plots without LUC 2,265 19 1,833 18 12 20 
Plots with LUC 9,418 81 8,266 82 88 80 
Of which:       
   No HH members 479 5 373 5 9 4 
   One HH member 8,182 87 7,214 87 89 87 
   Two HH members 757 8 679 8 2 9 
       
   Husband/male head 6,420 68 5,695 69 3 83 
   Wife/female head 1,570 17 1,345 16 82 3 
   Husband and wife 670 7 603 7 1 9 
   Other situation 758 8 623 8 14 6 
a The category also includes the type “residential land + garden”. 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of plots, by Land Use Certificatea
 Of plots with LUC: 
 
Without 
LUC 
 
(1) 
With LUC 
 
 
(2) 
Zero HH 
members 
(3) 
One HH 
member 
(4) 
Two HH 
members 
(5) 
Sig. diff 
between 
(4)-(5)? 
Plot characteristics       
Size (in sqm) 2,391 1,427 1,398 1,422 1,491  
Distance from house (mtr) 1726 871 1,655 854 1,032 ** 
Slope (% flat) 53 73 77 76 39 *** 
Irrigation (% irrigated) 51 74 63 76 62 *** 
% restricted crop choice 40 58 58 59 42 *** 
Acquirement (% state) 41 74 46 76 57 *** 
Acquired before 1993 (%) 43 60 43 62 57 - 
Acquired 1993-1997 (%) 24 27 29 27 22 - 
Acquired 1998-2002 (%) 21 9 20 8 15 - 
Acquired from 2003 (%) 12 4 8 3 6 - 
       
Number of plots 1,833 8,264 373 7,214 679 - 
a Annual and perennial crop land. The category also includes the type “residential land + garden”. 
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Table 3: Crops grown in most recent agricultural season, by Land Use Certificate situation 
Of plots with LUC: 
Crop No LUC With LUC Zero HH 
members 
One HH 
member 
Two HH 
members 
All 
       
Rice 56.4 69.6 61.1 70.5 65.0 67.2 
Maize 14.8 5.2 4.7 4.9 9.1 6.9 
Potato/cassava 6.8 4.4 6.5 4.2 6.1 4.9 
Peanuts 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.7 0.8 1.5 
Vegetables 3.5 3.6 2.4 3.6 4.5 3.6 
Other annual 2.6 2.3 3.0 2.4 0.5 2.4 
Fruit 3.6 4.8 6.2 4.5 6.7 4.6 
Coffee 4.8 3.3 5.3 3.4 0.5 3.5 
Tea 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.2 2.7 1.2 
Cashew nuts 1.6 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 
Sugarcane 0.4 0.6 1.8 0.4 1.9 0.5 
Pepper 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 
Other perenn. 3.3 2.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.8 
       
Annual crops 85.3 86.7 84.2 87.2 86.0 86.5 
Perennial crops 14.7 13.3 15.8 12.8 14.0 13.5 
       
All crop plots 
(Obs.) 
100 
(1,632) 
100 
(7,568) 
100 
(339) 
100 
(6,603) 
100 
(626) 
100 
(9,200) 
 
 
Table 4: Average and median rice yield, by Land Use Certificate situation of plota
 Observations Avg. kg/sqm Median kg/sqm 
No LUC 920 0.51 0.46 
With LUC 5267 0.51 0.48 
LUC on which:    
   Zero HH members 206 0.51 0.46 
   One HH member 4,654 0.52 0.49 
   Two HH members 407 0.48 0.48 
    
All plots 6,187 0.51 0.48 
a Only most recent agricultural season. One observation is dropped from the analysis with an extremely high yield 
value, being double the size of the next to highest yield value. 
Two tailed T-tests suggest there is no significant difference of average yields on redbook versus no redbook plots; and 
no significant difference in average yields between any combination of number of household members inscribed in the 
red book. 
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Table 5: Variable descriptions  
Variable Name Description 
Plot Characteristics 
Log(Area) Log of the area of the plot in square metres 
Distance Distance from home to plot in metres/100 
Irr_Canal Dummy indicator for whether the plot is irrigated via canals 
Irr_Other Dummy indicator for whether the plot is irrigated via other ways than canals 
Restrictions Dummy indicator for whether restrictions on the type of crop are in place 
Flat slope Dummy indicator for plot with a flat slope (base category for slopes) 
Slight slope Dummy indicator for plot with a slight slope 
Moderate Slope Dummy indicator for plot with a moderate slope 
Steep Slope Dummy indicator for plot with a steep slope 
Log(Salesalue) Log of the sales value of the plot, used as an indicator of plot quality 
Instruments  
State Dummy indicator for plot given by the state or commune 
Inherited Dummy indicator for plot inherited 
Market Dummy indicator for plot purchased on the market 
Other Dummy indicator for plot acquired in other ways e.g. cleared (base category) 
Acquired before 1993 Dummy indicator for plot being acquired before 1993 (base category) 
Acquired 1993-1998 Dummy indicator for plot being acquired between 1993 and 1998 
Acquired 1998-2003 Dummy indicator for plot being acquired between 1998 and 2003 
Acquired after 2003 Dummy indicator for plot being acquired after 2003 
Red Book Variables: 
Redbook Dummy indicator for plot with a red book (base category: no red book) 
RB_1person Dummy indicator for plot with only one HH member named in red book 
RB_2persons Dummy indicator for plot with 2 HH members named in red book 
Production Function Variables: 
Total Yields Rice kilograms per square metre produced by households 
Labour Labour units used in production of rice (per sq. metre) 
Seed Value of seeds and saplings used in production of rice (per sq. metre) 
Fertilizer Value of fertilizers used in production of rice (per sq. metre) 
Pesticide & Herbicide Value of pesticides and herbicides used in production of rice (per sq. metre) 
Efficiency Variables: 
Redbook Area share owned by the household with a red book 
RB_1person Area share owned by the household with 1 HH member in red book 
RB_2persons Area share owned by the household with 2 HH members in red book 
Red_1Male Area share owned by the household with husband/male head only in red book 
Red_1Fem Area share owned by the household with wife/female head only in red book 
Red_2HW  Area share owned by the household with husband and wife in red book 
Red_2Other Area share owned by the household with other people in red book 
Plot age Average age of plots used by household 
Irrigated Area share owned by the household that are irrigated 
Restrictions Area share owned by the household with restrictions 
Slight slope Area share owned by the household with a slight slope 
Mod. Slope Area share owned by the household with a moderate slope 
Steep Slope Area share owned by the household with a steep slope 
Sex Head Dummy indicator for gender of the head of household (=1 if male) 
Age Head Age of the head of household 
Married Dummy indicator for marital status of the head of household (=1 if married) 
Ed1 Dummy indicator for head of household completed primary school 
Ed2 Dummy indicator for head of household completed secondary school 
Ed3 Dummy indicator for head of household has a third level educaiton 
HHsize Household size 
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Table 6: Rice yields – within household variation – household fixed effects model 
 Full sample Male headed households Female 
headed HHs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(Area) -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.107*** 
 (0.041) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) 
Distance 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Irr_Canal -0.224* -0.311*** -0.336*** -0.373*** -0.345*** 0.222 
 (0.134) (0.071) (0.074) (0.082) (0.078) (0.217) 
Irr_Other -0.152* -0.237*** -0.139 -0.129 -0.262*** -0.154 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.116) (0.135) (0.099) (0.113) 
Restrictions -0.139 -0.384** -0.401** -0.426** -0.408** 0.647 
 (0.086) (0.154) (0.157) (0.167) (0.164) (0.672) 
Slight slope -0.077** -0.082 -0.122 -0.122 -0.082 -0.011 
 (0.034) (0.088) (0.094) (0.107) (0.102) (0.123) 
Moderate Slope -0.024 -0.051 -0.238 -0.298 -0.057 -0.212 
 (0.059) (0.133) (0.199) (0.222) (0.148) (0.286) 
Steep Slope 0.101 0.053 -0.019 -0.038 0.05 - 
 (0.130) (0.310) (0.319) (0.345) (0.333)  
Log(Salesvalue) 0.372*** 0.364*** 0.349*** 0.350*** 0.369*** 0.353*** 
 (0.136) (0.034) (0.036) (0.041) (0.038) (0.050) 
Redbook (instr) - 0.559*   0.595** -1.954 
  (0.289)   (0.299) (1.949) 
RB_1pers.(instr) -  0.875** 0.976**   
   (0.383) (0.399)   
RB_2pers.(instr) -  -0.883 -1.134   
   (1.163) (1.207)   
Constant 0.536 0.311 0.174 0.218 0.373 1.239 
 (0.373) (0.212) (0.240) (0.259) (0.232) (1.161) 
Within R2 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 
n 4808 4479 4479 3765 3765 713 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10 %. 
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Table 7: Efficiency estimates from translog household production function models (rice yields) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Plot age -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.030) (0.020) 0.029 0.019 
Irrigated -1.247*** -0.839*** -1.201*** -0.792*** -1.199*** -0.780*** 
 (0.436) (0.258) (0.403) (0.233) 0.398 0.219 
Restrictions -1.173* -0.762** 0.748** -0.677*** -1.011** -0.603*** 
 (0.614) (0.245) (0.372) (0.214) 0.501 0.197 
Slight slope 0.804** 0.517** 1.364** 0.470** 0.712** 0.451** 
 (0.413) (0.259) (0.551) (0.232) 0.367 0.223 
Mod. Slope 1.442** 0.838** 0.972 0.797** 1.317** 0.769** 
 (0.616) (0.371) (0.922) (0.340) 0.543 0.329 
Steep Slope 1.053 0.701 -1.062** 0.647 0.873 0.587 
 (1.032) (0.662) (0.525) (0.581) 0.911 0.553 
Sex Head  -0.140  -0.134  0.224 
  (0.350)  (0.328)  0.355 
Age Head  0.007  0.008  0.007 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  0.006 
Married  -0.201  -0.186  -0.182 
  (0.370)  (0.349)  0.325 
Ed1  -0.606**  -0.539**  -0.512**  
  (0.287)  (0.256)  (0.236) 
Ed2  -0.189  -0.151  -0.153 
  (0.217)  (0.191)  (0.182) 
Ed3  -1.781  -1.560  -1.426 
  (1.413)  (0.192)  (1.066) 
HHsize  -0.017  -0.016  -0.020 
  (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Redbook -0.458 -0.399**     
 (0.284) (0.191)     
Red_1person   -0.521** -0.419**   
   (0.272) (0.176)   
Red_2persons   -0.112 -0.101   
   (0.535) (0.033)   
Red_1Male     -0.467* -0.279* 
     0.255 0.166 
Red_1Fem     -0.822 -0.964** 
     0.578 0.388 
Red_2HW      -0.002 0.045 
     0.540 0.328 
Red_2Other     -0.238 -0.307 
     0.478 0.293 
Constant -0.553 0.045* -0.475 0.028 -0.422 0.092 
 (0.769) (0.671) (0.687) (0.615) 0.688 0.596 
Log Likelihood -503.37 -492.46 -502.48 -491.39 -502.03 -488.66 
n 1,523 1,523 1,523 1,523 1,523 1,523 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. 
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Appendix 1: Model 
To arrive at (1), we start from a household maximisation problem. We assume the household model 
is separable where production and consumption decisions can be taken independently. Assume a 
purely rice producing household. The household chooses the amount of input j ( ) to apply 
into rice production on each plot i in order to maximise its total rice output, which can be written as 
follows: 
1,..j = J
)(
1
1,..
max ,.. ,
i iJ
i iJ iI I i
f I I X∑  (A1) 
subject to ij j
i
I I≤∑      j∀  (A2) 
where ijI  is the amount of input j used on plot i and iX  includes the characteristics of plot i such as 
land quality or size. jI  is the total amount of input j available such as, total household labour time 
or seeds stored from last year (the assumption that no labour market or seed market exists is a very 
strong one but is used here for ease of explanation). ( )1 ,.. ,i iJ if I I X  is a concave rice production 
function. Analogous to Udry (1996), if ( )1 ,.. ,i iJ if I I X  is strictly increasing in X , (A1)-(A2) and 
iZ  = hZ  would imply that ( )1 ,.. ,i iJ if I I X = ( )1 ,.. ,h hJ hf I I X  or: 
( ) ( )( )1 ( ),.., ,i i i iJ iO X f I X I X X= i      i∀  (A3) 
This means that within the household, both plot output, ( )iO X , and plot inputs, depend purely on 
the characteristics of the plot. Udry shows further that if plot characteristics are allowed to vary 
over plots, this can be approximated by a first-order Taylor series. When (A3) is expressed in 
yields, it implies that the deviation of plot yield from average household rice yields is a function of 
the deviation of plot characteristics from mean plot characteristics which can be estimated by a 
household fixed effect approach. Adding household subscripts, we arrive at the expression for rice 
yield on plot i of household h, , presented in (1): hiQ hi hi hi h hiQ X Rβ α λ ε= + + + . 
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Appendix 2: Estimated reduced form equations and tests for overidentification – intra-
household rice yields model 
 Full Sample Male Headed HH Female 
Headed HH 
 Redbook RB_1pers RB_2pers RB_1pers RB_2pers Redbook Redbook 
Log(Area) 0.002 -0.002 0.004*** -0.004 0.005*** 0.0004 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 0.003 0.002 (0.004) (0.006) 
Distance -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.00003 -0.0003** -0.00002 -0.0003** -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00005) 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Irr_Canal 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.005 0.065*** 0.006 0.070*** 0.054*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) 0.010 0.005 (0.011) (0.018) 
Irr_Other 0.084*** 0.050*** 0.034*** 0.057*** 0.038*** 0.095*** -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) 0.011 0.005 (0.011) (0.019) 
Restrictions 0.079*** 0.051*** 0.028*** 0.051*** 0.031*** 0.082*** 0.038** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) 0.011 0.005 (0.012) (0.019) 
Slight slope 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.009* 0.047*** 0.011** 0.058*** 0.061*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) 0.012 0.005 (0.012) (0.022) 
Mod Slope -0.037*** 0.021 -0.058*** 0.023 -0.059*** -0.036** 0.065* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) 0.015 0.007 (0.016) (0.040) 
Steep Slope 0.041 0.041 0.0003 0.035 0.001 0.036 0.097 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.013) 0.030 0.014 (0.032) (0.110) 
Log(Value) 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.005*** 0.021*** 0.006*** 0.027*** 0.014** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 0.004 0.002 (0.004) (0.007) 
Instruments        
Acq 93-97 -0.056*** -0.052*** -0.005 -0.045*** -0.006 -0.052*** -0.093*** 
 (0.014) 0.013 0.006 0.015 (0.007) 0.015 0.025 
Acq_98-02 -0.181*** -0.135*** -0.046*** -0.146*** -0.049*** -0.195*** 0.022 
 (0.017) 0.016 0.007 0.018 (0.008) 0.019 0.044 
Acq_2003+ -0.253*** -0.198*** -0.055*** -0.215*** -0.060*** -0.275*** -0.033 
 (0.022) 0.021 0.009 0.023 (0.010) 0.024 0.051 
State 0.252*** 0.197*** 0.055*** 0.198*** 0.058*** 0.256*** 0.156*** 
 (0.015) 0.014 0.006 0.015 (0.007) 0.016 0.038 
Market 0.164*** 0.100*** 0.064*** 0.095*** 0.066*** 0.161*** 0.083** 
 (0.017) 0.016 0.007 0.018 (0.008) 0.019 0.042 
Inherit 0.157*** 0.101*** 0.056*** 0.089*** 0.057*** 0.146*** 0.133*** 
 (0.019) 0.018 0.008 0.020 (0.009) 0.021 0.046 
Constant 0.508*** 0.555*** -0.047*** 0.553*** -0.049*** 0.504*** 0.623*** 
 (0.030) 0.028 0.012 0.032 0.015) 0.034 0.057 
Within R2 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.012 0.11 0.18 0.08 
n 7,747 7,747 7,747 6,514 6,514 6,514 1,229 
Test Statistic 
(p-value) 
3.15* 
(0.076) 
3.37* 
(0.067) 
1.04 
(0.308) 
4.75** 
(0.029) 
1.44 
(0.231) 
4.46** 
(0.035) 
1.22 
(0.269) 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10 %. 
The Test Statistic refers to an F-test of the coefficient on the residuals of the reduced form model when included in the 
original structural model. 
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Appendix 3: Parameter estimates of Translog Household Production Function Models (Rice 
Yields) and Specification Testing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.215*** 0.224*** 0.218*** 0.228*** 0.219*** 0.229*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
1ln x  0.161*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
2ln x  0.141*** 0.140*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.142*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
3ln x  0.323*** 0.321*** 0.322*** 0.320*** 0.322*** 0.323*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
4ln x  0.151*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
1ln x * 1ln x  0.028*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2ln x * 2ln x  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
3ln x * 3ln x  0.089*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
4ln x * 4ln x  0.022** 0.021** 0.022** 0.021** 0.022** 0.020** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
1ln x * 2ln x  0.015 0.020 0.016 0.021 0.015 0.019 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
1ln x * 3ln x  -0.046** -0.046** -0.045** -0.044** -0.044** -0.043** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
1ln x * 4ln x  0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
2ln x * 3ln x  -0.037** -0.039** -0.038** -0.041*** -0.038** -0.039** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
2ln x * 4ln x  0.063*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
3ln x * 4ln x  -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.051*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
2σˆ (v) 0.081 0.079 0.080 0.078 0.080 0.077 
2σˆ (u) 0.519 0.346 0.488 0.319 0.484 0.304 
LR Test Stats:       
TL v. CD 
(DF=10) 
125.66 126.51 125.93 125.83 126.10 128.11 
1ˆ
ˆ... 0pδ δ= = =  89.26 (DF=7) 
111.10 
(DF=14) 
91.06 
(DF=8) 
113.23 
(DF=15) 
91.94 
(DF=10) 
118.69 
(DF=17) 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. 
1ln x  is the log of labour, 2ln x  is the log of seed, 3ln x  is the log of fertilizer, 4ln x  is the log of pesticides and 
herbicides, 2σˆ (v) is an estimate of the variance of the statistical noise term, 2σˆ (u) is an estimate of the variance of the 
efficiency effects, TL and CD stand for the Translog and Cobb-Douglas models respectively, and p is the number of 
variables in the inefficiency equation and DF.  
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